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This paper incorporâtes a rôle for expectations in the 
short-run behavior of labour supply décision, présents a 
theory introducing labour market expectations as a variable 
influencing labour supply, and discusses the relative merits 
of the expectations model vis-à-vis the traditional model 
using the empirical resulis derived in this work. 
INTRODUCTION 
Classical labour supply theory postulâtes that the individual chooses 
the number of hours per period that he will offer to work by equating 
the marginal utility to be derived from an additional hour of leisure 
to the prevailling real wage. The calculus of this décision is more complex 
in the real world of imperfect markets and non-homogeneity. In ail 
likelihood, the short-run aggregate labour supply schedule may not be 
a smoothly rising function — as usally postulated in the textbooks 
— but, may hâve discontinuâmes, reflecting such vagaries as minimum 
wage laws, discrimination, legislated hours of work, etc. Moreover, 
long-run labour supply theory suggests that the choice to work or not 
to work may not be the relevant one faced by an individual. This 
theory (neo-classical in scope) profers the principle that the individual 
attempts to maximize his net return 
on human capital. That is, he 
chooses the occupation that yields 
the highest monetary and non-pecu-
niary rate of return.x Yet even this 
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theory abstracts from the labour supply décisions of a large segment of 
the population for whom labour force participation (hereafter referred 
to as LFP) is not automatic. Active LFP by this group of persons is a 
short-run décision, strongly influenced by cyclical factors. 
This paper incorporâtes a rôle for expectations in the short-run 
behaviour of labour supply décision. A theory is presented which in-
troduces labour market expectations as a variable influencing labour 
supply. The concluding section of this paper discusses the relatives 
merits of the expectations model vis-à-vis the traditional model using 
the empirical results derived in the paper. 
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 
The marginal or secondary work force consists primarily of married 
females, teen-agers, young adults, retired and semi-retired persons2-3. 
Their labour force affiliation is usually casual and consequently exhibits 
volatile changes. A priori, one should expect this type of LFP behaviour 
since the permanent status of two of thèse groups (i.e. their being 
married or retired) dépends upon fairly binding constraints. Their long-
run choices are influenced by « trends in socio-economic conditions and 
attitudes involving such things a s . . . the desirability of women being 
housewives » 4 or by pension funds and social security. Their member-
ship in the labour force is also subject to short-run influences ; that is, 
it reflects the short-run supply elasticity to the real wage differential 
between labour market and non-market activities. 5 
2
 This statement, perhaps, requires some qualification since not ail primeage 
maies are full-time members of the labour force. Indeed, some are probably sen-
sitive to the additional or discouraged worker effects. It should also be pointed 
out that the distinction between maies and females that we hâve presented is in 
no way intended to exhibit maie chauvinism on our part. It simply reflects 
commonly accepted practices in this area of économies. 
3
 The simplistic categorization of persons between the âges of 14 and 24 
years as being in this group is questionable. It can be argued that this treatment 
is inconsistent with the dichotomy between the short-run LFP décisions of the 
secondary labour force and the longer-run occupational choice of the primary 
labour force. It would seem more appropriate to include only those teenagers as 
well as ail other students whose labour force involvement is of a short-term nature 
within the définition of the secondary labour force. This is the position we 
adopt throughout the paper. 
4 J.G. CRAGG (2). 
5 «In addition to pecuniary conditions involved in market alternatives are 
the ease of finding a job, its locational and other conveniences, and attractiveness 
of the job wanted ». Mincer (4). 
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Many economists hâve focused their research on the discouraged 
worker-added worker effects on the LFP of the secondary labour force. 6 
The main thrust of their empirical studies has been to examine the 
short-run responsiveness of LFP of thèse various démographie groups 
to the cyclical variation in employment conditions in order to distinguish 
between the additional worker and discouraged worker hypothesis. The 
additional worker hypothesis maintains that unemployment of the main 
earner in a family will reduce family income and thus encourage other 
family members to enter the labour force. The other hypothesis — the 
discouraged worker effect — maintains that the secondary workers 
enter or leave the labour force when they feel that market alternatives 
are more or less favourable relative to non-market alternatives. The 
concern with this form of labour supply theory is intimately related to 
the concept of « hidden unemployment».7 
THE MODEL 
The unemployment rate is regarded as the key explanatory variable 
in the short-run LFP relationship. In its simplest form, this relationship 
is usually specified as : 
(1)
 t* t = fi (tunt), 
where
 tn{ is the LFP rate of group i, and tunt is the national unem-
ployment rate. 
In this spécification, the two effects — the additional worker effect 
and the discouraged worker effect — cannot be empirically separated 
out. Only the net effect can be measured; i.e. if 
df* (2.1) > 0, 
6 BOWEN and FINEGAN (1), DERNBURG and STRAND (3), MIN-
CER (4), OFFICER and ANDERSON (5). 
7
 « To the extent that prolonged periods of unemployment discourage LFP, 
there is a kind of « hidden unemployment » which ought to be taken into account 
in assessing the true économie costs on unemployment and in estimating the change 
in demand necessary to push the officiai unemployment rate to any prescribed level. 
How much of a social problem as well as an économie problem is entailed in 
« hidden unemployment » dépends in part on the particular groups whose LFP is 
most sensitive to the over-all level of unemployment. » BOWEN and FINEGAN, 
(1), PP. 
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the additional worker effect is said to predominate, if8 
(2.2) < 0 
the discouraged worker effect is stronger. 
Mincer has pointed out that équation (1) is a mis-specification 
of the true relationship. More specifically, it is under-identified. He has 
stated that: 9 
« . . . thèse two effects coexist... Additional workers may 
enter the labour market to bolster family income in a reces-
sion, but at the same time some unemployed workers may give 
up the apparently hopeless job search and withdraw from the 
labour market, whereas potential labour force entrants or 
re-entrants may be inhibited from even starting to look for 
jobs. » 
The following variant of équation (1) allows separately for each 
of the two side effects: 
(3) & = ^ (tuit, tuHt), 
where
 tuit is the unemployment rate of group i and tuHt is the unem-
ployment rate of the head of the household. Intuitively, 10>11 
ô f i
 r, *# 
< 0 and > 0. 
Even though the association of the LFP of a group with the same 
group's unemployment rate is intuitively attractive, this spécification is 
seldom used in empirical work.12 
First of ail, conditions in the various sub-labor markets tend to 
move in the same direction. This tends to resuit in a high degree of 
intercorrelation among the various unemployment rates. Hence, the use 
of two or more unemployment rates as regressors will yield ambiguous 
g jf d f l = 0, neither effect prédominâtes, i.e. the two effects either cancel 
dtunt out in the aggregate or are non-existent to begin with. 
9 Op. Cit., p. 74. 
io The discouraged worker effect reduces the participation rate of group i. 
11
 The additional worker effect augments the participation rate. 
12 A notable exception is the work of J.G. CRAGG (2), Chapter 2. 
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and inconclusive results.13 This problem has been circumvented in 
previous empirical work by substituting an alternative variable for either 
one of the unemployment rates.14 
A second reason is offered by Dernburg and Strand 15 : 
« (The purpose of LFP studies is to examine) cyclical effects 
on LFP and since the discouraged worker hypothesis relates to 
total labour market tightness, we prefer to utilize the aggregate 
employment ratio rather than the group spécifie employment 
ratios. » 
Their position is strengthened by Bowen and Finegan's observation that 
« the overall unemployment rate is likely to be of some significance to 
almost ail prospective labour force participants. » 16 
Since active or potential labour market participants form expecta-
tions concerning wages and other conditions of employment, they may 
also décide to participate or not to participate in the labour force on 
the basis of the probability of finding a satisfactory job. More precisely, 
we postulate that in period t, the décision to participate in the labour 
force in period t + 1 is a function of currently held expectations of 
future labour market conditions. That is, 
(4) m = h1 (U , T), 
K
 ' t t+l vt nt+l» J> 
where the left subscripts represent the period in which the expectations 
are formed, the right subscripts represent the period for which the ex-
pectations are to be realized. T is a time trend. 
In a time séries analysis, it is impossible to segregate purely 
short-run phenomena from long-run influences. Since our interest is 
purely in short-run behaviour, we include a time trend to capture 
changing patterns in permanent LFP behaviour. In addition, we postulate 
that actual participation behaviour adapts to changing labour market 
conditions in the following manner. 
13
 In econometric ternis, the use of OLS in the présence of multicoïlinearity 
among the independent variables will produce inefficient estimators of the 
structural parameters. That is, the separate influence of each of the variables may 
not be accurately reflected by the resulting parameter estimâtes. 
14
 For example, Dernburg and Strand (3), used unemployment insurance be-
nefit exhaustions with a lead of two months in place of
 tuHt. OFFICER and 
ANDERSON (5), used unemployment duration variables in place of
 tuHt. 
15 DERNBURG and STRAND (3), op. cit., p. 75. 
16 BOWEN and FINEGAN (1), op. cit., p. 122. 
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(5) ni = gi r u / u ) ni 
v
 ' t+l t+l 6 M + l n t + l ' t n t+ l ' t t t+l 
in our empirical work we use the following multiplicative form of 
the model. 
fti lit Y1 
(6) ni = ai U e ( U / U ) e1 
K
 ' t+l t+l t nt+1 v t+l n t+ l ' t nt+K t+l» 
where 
(6.1) n;+ i = a| U ^ , " " and 
Equation (6) is estimated in the following log-linear form: 
(7) In( t+,n;+i) = Ina' + /WnJJ^, + Mt + V 
t+l 
THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation (7) has been estimated using seasonaly adjusted and raw 
quarterly averages of monthly data for twelve âge and sex groups for the 
period 1955 : 1 to 1970 : 3. In the estimating équation we truncated the 
lag in équation (6.2) and used the following variable in place of




/ 8i (1 - §i)i x 
( " s ôi(l_ôi)i ) H U r 
\ j=0 / 
We experimented with values of ôi, ranging between 0.15 and 0.95 at 
0.05 intervais; together with three values for m (4, 8, 12 quarters). The 
équations reported in tables 1 and 2 are those with the highest explained 
variation for each of the 12 age-sex groups. The time trend variable 
commences with the value of unity in 1955 : 1, inereasing to the value 
of 63 in 1970 : 3. 
The estimated parameters for the twelve age-sex-groups of the model 
are reported in tables 1 and 2. 
In an equilibrium situation, when actual and expected unemployment 
rates are equal in a given period, the P parameter measures the net ad-
ditional or discouraged worker effect. The reported results in table 1 
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show a net discouraged worker effect for five of the twelve groups 
— maies 14-19, females 14-19, females 20-24, maies 65 + and 
females 25-44. However, the P coefficient is only statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level in the first three cases. In the remaming 
seven groups the additional worker effect prédominâtes, although for 
maies 45-54 and 55-64 the effect is not statistically significant.17 
The adjustment process — represented by the Y parameter — may 
reflect an additional aspect to the additional worker — discouraged 
worker dichotomy. If Y is positive, and the actual unemployment rate 
exceeds the expected rate, labour force participation will rise above 
planned levels of the previous quarter. Similarly, if Y is négative, LFP 
would décline, ceteris paribus. With this interprétation it may seem 
reasonable to assume that the Y and P parameters should hâve the same 
sign. In eight of the twelve cases, the signs differ, but in six of those 
eight cases, either one of the coefficients is not statistically différent 
from 0. 
In five cases Y is significantly différent from zéro (maies 14-19, 
females 14-19, maies 45-55, maies 65 +, females 25-44) suggesting 
that the adjustment process postulated is relatively unimportant for the 
remaming seven groups. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The crux of the problem posed in this paper revolves on the impact 
of labour market expectations, as reflected by movements in past unem-
ployment rates on current labour force participation practices. This issue 
is highlighted when équation (6) is reduced into the following ex-
pression: 
17 Thèse findings differ from the results of a study by OFFICER and AN-
DERSON (5). OFFICER and ANDERSON detected a uniform discouraged 
worker effect for ail maie groups, and a uniform added worker effect for females. 
Part of the différences might reflect our emphasis on expectations as opposed to 
their emphasis on duration of unemployment. 
However, they state that: 
« a variable of greater intensity may be a better représentation 
of the additional worker effect. » 
(OFFICER and ANDERSON (5), op. cit., p. 281). 
Thus, one would expect positive coefficients on the S3 /u and S6 / u variables 
m m m m 
when they appear in the régressions. A perusal of their table 1 indicates that this 
expectation is fulfilled only for the female âge groups and even in thèse cases, 
one must be wary of the results since both employment effects do not appear 
to be présent simultaneously. 
EMPLOYMENT EXPECTATIONS AND LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION . . . 327 
<8>
 t+lnj+1 = a V ^ y x't l^1 l^1 t n t+l n e 
t+1 t+l 
When presented in this form our model differs from the traditional 
labour force participation model by the inclusion of the expected unem-
ployment rate variable (tUn ). The coefficient on this expectation va-
nt+i 
riable [PMr1] is the key to testing our hypothesis. 
If the estimated PMr* coefficient is not statistically différent from 
zéro then our expectations hypothesis would play no rôle in LFP 
décisions. If at the same time Y1 is significantly différent from zéro, the 
empirical results would support the traditional model. On the other 
hand, if the [fMr*] coefficient is significantly différent than zéro, then 
our expectations hypothesis would appear to be important. If this occurs 
in conjunction with a Y1 coefficient not statistically différent from zéro, 
then this would imply the primacy of our expectations hypothesis over 
the traditional model. 
Table 3 summarizes the empirical validity of the two hypothèses. 
For nine of the twelve démographie groups, the expectations hypothesis 
appears supported. In four of thèse nine cases, expected conditions in 
labour markets dominate the LFP décision. 
TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF THE TRADITIONAL VERSUS THE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Significant at 95% Not Statistically 
Confidence Level Significant 
Significant at 95% 
Confidence Level 
P* 
Not Statistically Significant 0 cases (0) 3 cases (4) 
Note:—The data presented in the table are based on régression équations re-
ported in table 1. The information in parenthèses is derived from table 2. 
For none of the démographie groups did the empirical results sup-
port only the traditional model. Thus it appears that LFP models that 
include only the current unemployment rate may be omitting an im-
portant explanatory variable. This in turn implies that the statistical 
properties of the estimated parameter on the unemployment rate para-
meter would be biased. 
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If in table 1 the reader compares the relatives magnitude of the Y 
values of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables, and, 
hence their relative contribution to the total explained variation of the 
LFP rate, one notice the dominance of the long-run forces (that is, 
In a1 and Y*). Thus it is possible that the discouraged worker — added 
worker effect debate has missed the boat on relevant issues. In fact, we 
tend to agrée with Mincer in his statement that « . . .powerful trend 
factors and institutional changes continue to dominate the behaviour of 
labour force groups . . . [and that] much more attention should be paid 
to those factors and changes.18 
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SEASONALY ADJUSTED LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RÉGRESSIONS: EQUATION 7 
Maies m ô* 
14-19 8 .25 
20-24 8 .25 
25-44 8 .25 
45_54 4 .75 
55_64 4 .85 
65 + 8 .50 
Femaïes 
14-19 4 .80 
20-24 8 .25 
25-44 8 .25 
45-54 8 .25 
55-64 8 .25 
65 + 8 .25 
TABLE 2 
lna1 Ai Dl D2 D3 Y1 F pi_Yi R D W 
-.6555 -.0045 -.0592 .0608 .3052 .1303 -.1035 -.2339 .950 1.30 
(-16.52) (-17.13) (-4.37) (4.55) (22.90) (4.17) (-4.60) (-6.43) 
-.1168 -.0017 -.0102 .0403 .0690 .0016 .0159 .0143 .911 1.23 
(-7.83) (-17.11) (-2.01) (8.02) (13.77) (.14) (1.88) (1.04) 
-.0250 -.0001 -.0053 .0014 .0043 -.0028 .0030 -.0058 .761 .50 
(-9.47) (-8.30) (-5.85) (1.57) (4.87) (-1.37) (1.97) (2.39) 
-.0378 -.0001 -.0091 .0002 ,0032 .0086 .0009 -.0077 .709 .75 
(-11.98) (-6.29) (-7.57) (.18) (2.76) (1.85) (.53) (-1.60) 
-.1371 -.0004 -.0135 .0049 .0089 .0037 .0001 -.0036 .723 .83 
(-22.22) (-8.03) (-5.68) (2.11) (3.80) (0.38) (.03) (-.36) 
-1.0129 -.0069 -.0484 .0166 .0331 .0685 -.0213 -.0898 .949 .58 
(_34.44) (-32.83) (-4.51) (1.57) (3.14) (2.08) (-1.29) (-2.53) 
-1.0815 -.0016 -.0830 -.0240 .1645 .1445 -.0257 -.1702 .878 1.20 
(-32.10) (-6.22) (-6.43) (-1.89) (13.01) (2.82) (-1.36) (-3.23) 
-.6855 .0045 -.0006 .0177 -.0028 .0092 -.0833 -.0925 .932 .77 
(-27.89) (27.30) (-08) (2.14) (-33) (.47) (-5.98) (-4.11) 
-1.4302 .0083 -.0269 -.0110 -.0278 .0378 -.0077 -.0455 .993 .99 
(-102.38) (89.42) (-5.64) (-2.34) (-5.92) (3.43) (-98) (-4.55) 
-1.5302 .0097 -.0029 -.0040 -.0202 -.0233 .0659 .0891 .947 .27 
(-34.97) (33.28) (-1.53) (-27) (-1.37) (-.67) (2.65) (2.22) 
-2.0004 .0117 -.0031 .0076 -.0136 -.0284 .1007 .1291 =938 =28 
(-34.82) (30.53) (-16) (.39) (-70) (-.63) (3.09) (2.45) 
-3.2387 .0038 -.0111 -.0042 -.0537 .0088 .1399 .1311 .310 .36 
(-30.51) (5.32) (-.31) (-.12) (-1.51) (.11) (2.32) (1.35) 
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Les prévisions de l'emploi et le taux de participation 
de la main-d'œuvre au Canada 
La théorie classique en matière de l'offre de travail présume que chaque 
individu opte pour l'horaire qui peut lui procurer l'avantage d'une heure supplémen-
taire de loisir au cours de la journée. Cependant, il n'en est pas ainsi à l'intérieur 
de marchés du travail imparfaits et sans homogénéité sur lesquels se reflètent les 
caprices des lois sur le salaire minimum, la discrimination et la durée des horaires, 
etc. . . 
De plus, même si, théoriquement, on peut affirmer que l'individu choisit l'emploi 
qu'il estime le plus convenable tant pour le salaire qu'il reçoit que pour les loisirs 
que sa tâche lui laisse, les choses ne se passent pas toujours ainsi dans la pratique. 
Il arrive que les décisions personnelles soient donc influencées par des facteurs 
cycliques. 
Aussi les prévisions relatives au marché du travail peuvent-elles constituer une 
variable qui peut influer sur l'offre et, par conséquent, sur le taux de participation 
de la main-d'œuvre selon la théorie qui est exposée dans le présent article à partir 
des conditions du marché du travail au Canada entre 1955 et 1970. Il paraît ressortir 
de cette analyse que la man-d'œuvre marginale formée du groupe d'âge 14-19 ans 
(hommes et femmes), du groupe d'âge 19-24 ans (femmes), des femmes mariées 
et des personnes à la retraite est relativement sensible aux facteurs prévisionnels en 
matière d'emploi. Elles rechercheront du travail ou se retireront du marché selon 
que les conditions y seront intéressantes ou moins bonnes. Ainsi, il peut arriver que 
ces catégories de salariés, en périodes de récession, entrent sur le marché du travail 
afin de relever le revenu de la famille tout comme des employés depuis longtemps 
en chômage peuvent s'en retirer par découragement. 
Ceci tend à indiquer que ce ne sont pas uniquement les contraintes économiques, 
c'est-à-dire la nécessité de travailler pour vivre, qui exercent une influence à la 
hausse ou à la baisse sur le taux effectif de participation d'une population à la 
main-d'œuvre. De multiples facteurs, qui parfois se contredisent d'une personne à 
l'autre, sont constamment à l'œuvre. 
Le travailleur démoralisé par l'état mauvais du marché du travail contribue à 
réduire le taux de participation tandis que le travailleur motivé l'accroît. 
Corrigenda 
The authorship crédit for the article « White Collar Unions in Den-
mark » should hâve read; by Albert A. Blum with Allen Ponak, volume 
29, numéro 1, 1974, p. 65. 
